Abstract. Propensity-to-vote (PTV) scores are ever more commonly used in electoral research as a measure of electoral utilities. Yet a growing literature employs them as dependent variable in the voting equation in place of the lower information granted by vote recall questions.
Introduction
The last two decades have witnessed the burgeoning of empirical voting research making use of PTV measures (Tilllie, 1995; van der Eijk and Franklin, 1996; van der Eijk et al., 2006; van der Brug and Mughan, 2007; van der Brug et al., 2008; van der Eijk and Franklin, 2009 ). An interval-level measure of electoral utility overcomes many drawbacks related to the nominal nature of the dependent variable of electoral research in multi-party systems, and allows researchers to model voting choices with a higher degree of methodological accuracy (van der Eijk, 2002) .
According to van der Eijk et al. (2006) PTV scores are to be understood as a cardinal measure of the perceived utility proceeding from political parties to individual voters. As opposed to probability measures, PTVs are not bounded to sum to any fixed amount (i.e., in the case of probabilities to one). This non-ipsative feature of voting propensities is tightly related to the cardinal character of this measure. This fundamental feature of PTV scores is obtained by introducing a projective element postponing voters' choice in an undefined future within the question wording:
"Would you indicate for each party how probable it is that you will ever vote for that party?" (van der Eijk and Niemoller, 1983) From a theoretical point of view, PTVs' coordinates are to be found in random utility theory, which interprets the electoral utilities perceived by voters as a random variable and the subsequent voting choice as a deterministic process (Manski and Lerman, 1977) . On these bases, PTVs lie at the core of a two-stage model of voting. In the first stage, voters assess the electoral utilities coming from each party in the choice set. In the second one, voters use this estimated electoral utility to formulate their voting decision Ch. 2) .
The use of PTVs as dependent variable of voting research has two important advantages.
From a methodological point of view, it permits to avoid the drawbacks inherent to the use of discrete choice models (for a better discussion of this point, see: van der Brug and Mughan, 2007) . Secondly, moving from a nominal to a cardinal dependent variable also enables quantitative researchers to overcome problems intrinsic to cross-country comparative analyses (van der Eijk and Franklin, 1996; van der Brug et al., 2008) . This last feature is related to the fact that PTVs switch simultaneously the level of analysis as well as the level of conceptualization. Indeed, the level of analysis shifts downwards from the individual to the intra-individual level, forcing one to reinterpret both the dependent and the independent variables in terms of individual*parties relationships. From a conceptual point of view, the object of analysis is no longer a specific party, but a generic one (regardless of the specific characteristics of the party system).
Notwithstanding, the propensity to vote for a party and the actual choice to vote for that party remain two separate phenomena. A high propensity score for a specific party does not necessarily imply that the voter will choose that party at the ballot: other parties may have equally high, or even higher scores. Strategic considerations may also be at work (Rosema, 2006) . The attractiveness of emerging political leaders can represent as well a source of crosspressure for voters -this being ever more the case in times of personalization of politics (McAllister, 2007; Garzia, 2011) . For sure PTVs and the vote are closely connected, but the individual-level dynamics underlying this connection remain unclear. Suffice it to say that, in terms of electoral survey research, the very same question wording may capture different meanings if asked before or after the election. Pre-electoral PTVs can easily be thought as having a causal impact on voting intentions. In the case of post-electoral surveys, propensities to ever vote for a party are likely to be "colored" to at least some extent by respondents' voting choice in the last election.
To the best of our knowledge, no empirical study has ever investigated the drivers of change in patterns of PTVs as well as the role of actual voting behavior in the process of change. In order to provide initial answers to these questions and fill this relevant gap in the PTV literature, we make use of national election study data from the Italian case. The two studies that will be employed, from 2006 and 2011 respectively, provide us with the unprecedented chance to look at the meaning of PTVs before and after elections, as well as in a non-electoral year. The employment of panel data will also allow to appraise the actual stability of PTVs throughout time as well as the main drivers of change.
Data and Methods
The data employed in this analysis comes from two mass surveys conducted by the In line with the existing literature on PTVs, we stack our data in order to obtain a structure defined at the level stemming from the interaction of individuals and parties (van der Eijk et al., 2006) . Following the logic of the stacked data matrix, the unit of analysis is represented by respondent*party combinations. The dependent variable is a 10-point scale probing voters' propensity to ever vote for each of the parties included as stacks. 2 All the main attitudinal predictors are already interpretable in terms of respondent*party combination. Party identification is measured through the usual combination of survey questions tapping both the directional and the strength component: respondents are thus assigned a value ranging from 0 (not identified with the party in the specific combination) to 3 (strongly identified with that party). Respondents' evaluation of party leaders is tapped by the thermometer score probing their personality assessment on a 10-point scale, whereas ideological proximity is measured as the absolute difference between the respondents' placement of the self and each of the parties on the left-right scale. effect of party size (measured at the percentage vote shares obtained by each party in the previous relevant election) that, especially in multi-party systems, is known to increase voters' propensity to vote for larger parties (van der Eijk and Franklin, 1996; 2009) .
Results
As a preliminary step, we estimated four OLS models with the aim of uncovering the underlying structure of vote propensities for the main Italian parties. In Table 1 we present ordinary least squares estimates of propensities to vote in 2006, taking into account data from both the preand the post-electoral wave separately, and in 2011 (a non-electoral year) focusing crosssectionally on each wave in turn. Our simple model relies on the standard explanatory variables (as presented above) that have been identified by electoral researchers as the most relevant predictors of voting choice in Western democracies (Thomassen, 2005) , as well as in the Italian case (Bellucci and Segatti, 2011) . In this exploratory section of the analysis we simply observe the effect exerted by these variables on electoral utilities in the surveys at hand.
The picture emerging from the standardized estimates reported in Table 1 fits well with the most recent voting literature from the Second Italian Republic, which stresses the strong personalization of the political system and of voting choices in turn (Garzia and Viotti, 2011) .
In fact, leader evaluations emerge as the strongest predictor of PTVs in each and every model. In terms of explanatory power, party leader assessments are followed by party-voter proximity on the left-right scale. Socio-structural and economic controls, on the contrary, do not seem to play much of a role -in line, once again, with the available empirical evidence that demonstrates the declining ability of socio-structural factors to influence Italian voters' behavior.
More interestingly to our purposes is the observation of an extremely stable pattern of coefficients throughout the surveys. Regardless of the political context in which the various surveys have been conducted (i.e., electoral vs. non-electoral periods) the structural content of We restructured our stacked data matrix using as new dependent variable the difference in PTVs (i.e., PTVt2 -PTVt1). We have re-estimated the y-hat values for the socio-structural variables, which are obviously not expected to change in the short term. As to the attitudinal measures included in the model, we computed the first differences for the measures of partisanship, party-voter proximity on the left-right scale, leader assessments as well as retrospective economic evaluations. Our empirical model of PTV change can be stated as follows:
So, what drives changes in PTVs? Our first-differences models (as presented in Table 2 , columns 1 and 4) show that changes in the score attributed to party leaders play the greatest role in PTV dynamics. Changes on the relative party-voter distance on issues as well as on the partisanship dimensions play only a secondary role. It would thus appear that patterns of PTV change are most strongly affected by changes in those factors that shape them more heavily: party leader assessment. 5 <Table 2 about here>
We also tried to introduce voting choice itself as a predictor of PTV change in the 2006 model (Table 2 , column 2). While recognizing that in the prevailing view voting choice should be deterministically produced as a result of the individual's calculus of voting propensities (and hence a model of PTV that includes vote as predictor should be seen as mispecified), we are interested in understanding whether PTVs are vulnerable to a feedback effect proceeding from voting choice. In this alternative framework, PTVs might incorporate an individual bias related to the rationalization of the act of voting, which may raise the evaluation of the party towards which the ballot has been cast. Evidence shows that voting choice has a significant but only modest role in PTV changes (β = .03), making the feedback hypothesis very difficult to hold.
As a further check, we included a statistical control tapping the increase/decrease of party's vote shares in the 2006 election as compared to the previous general election (Table 2, column 3). The effect of aggregate electoral gains on PTVs is statistically significant and signed as expected -parties winning more votes than in the previous election do become more 5 To check for the robustness of this finding, we also tested the alternative hypothesis by which changes in party leader evaluations are casued by (rather than causes of) changing patterns of propensity to vote. This hypothesis is nonetheless falsified by the results of a number of Granger's tests, which show that the effect of leader evaluations (pre) on PTVs (post) is in every case stronger than that exerted by PTVs (pre) on leader evaluations (post). attractive to voters. Yet the inclusion of this variable do not add substantially to the explanatory power of the model, nor it alters in any way the coefficients of the other variables.
Concluding Remarks
PTV measures are ever more commonly used as the dependent variable of electoral research. In turn, these results provide support for the notion of PTVs as a concept projected in an undefined future (van der Eijk et al., 2006) . Italian voters would seem to understand the difference between actual vote choices and the likelihood to ever vote for a party (with the former bearing only a modest effect on the latter). Needless to say, more research on individual country cases as well as in comparative perspective is in order if we are to understand the extent to which these conclusions hold beyond the borders of Italian (often claimed) uniqueness. 
